
**Information technology — Open
Connectivity Foundation (OCF)
Specification —**

**Part 2:
Security specification**

*Technologies de l'information — Spécification de la Fondation pour la
connectivité ouverte (Fondation OCF) —*

Partie 2: Spécification de sécurité



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This document was prepared by the Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) (as the OCF Security Specification, Version 1.0.0) and drafted in accordance with its editorial rules. It was adopted, under the JTC 1 PAS procedure, by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*.

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1 Scope

This specification defines security objectives, philosophy, resources and mechanism that impacts OCF base layers of the OCF Core Specification. The OCF Core Specification contains informative security content. The OCF Security specification contains security normative content and may contain informative content related to the OCF base or other OCF specifications.

2 Normative References

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

OCF Core Specification, version 1.1, Open Connectivity Foundation, October 11, 2016. Latest version available at: https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Core_Specification.pdf.

OCF Device Specification, version 1.1, Open Connectivity Foundation, October 11, 2016. Latest version available at: https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Device_Specification.pdf.

OCF Resource Type Specification, version 1.1, Open Connectivity Foundation, October 11, 2016. Latest version available at: https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Resource_Type_Specification.pdf.

JSON SCHEMA, draft version 4, JSON Schema defines the media type "application/schema+json", a JSON based format for defining the structure of JSON data. JSON Schema provides a contract for what JSON data is required for a given application and how to interact with it. JSON Schema is intended to define validation, documentation, hyperlink navigation, and interaction control of JSON Available at: <http://json-schema.org/latest/json-schema-core.html>.

RAML, Restful API modelling language version 0.8. Available at: <http://raml.org/spec.html>.

OCF Security Resource Definitions, *API Definition Language for OCF Security Components*, Release OCF-v1.0.0
<https://github.com/openconnectivityfoundation/security>