

IEC/TR 62443-3-1

Edition 1.0 2009-07

TECHNICAL REPORT



Industrial communication networks – Network and system security – Part 3-1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems





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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

PRICE CODE

ICS 25.040.40; 33.040.040; 35.040

ISBN 2-8318-1053-7

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INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS - NETWORK AND SYSTEM SECURITY -

Part 3-1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems

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IEC 62443-3-1, which is a technical report, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 65: Industrial-process measurement, control and automation.

This technical report is closely related to ANSI/ISA-TR99.03.01-2007.

The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:

Enquiry draft	Report on voting
65/424/DTR	65/431A/RVC

Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report on voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

A list of all parts of IEC 62443 series, published under the general title *Industrial* communication networks – Network and system security, can be found on the IEC website.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until the maintenance result date indicated on the IEC web site under http://webstore.iec.ch in the data related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be:

- reconfirmed;
- · withdrawn;
- · replaced by a revised edition, or
- · amended.

A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.

NOTE The revision of this technical report will be synchronized with the other parts of the IEC 62443 series.

IMPORTANT – The "colour inside" logo on the cover page of this publication indicates that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this publication using a colour printer.

INTRODUCTION

The need for protecting Industrial Automation and Control System (IACS) computer environments from malicious cyberintrusions has grown significantly over the last decade. The combination of the increased use of open systems, platforms, and protocols in the IACS environment, along with an increase in joint ventures, alliance partners and outsourcing, has lead to increased threats and a higher probability of cyberattacks. As these threats and vulnerabilities increase, the risk of a cyberattack on an industrial communication network correspondingly increases, as well as the need for protection of computer and networked-based information sharing and analysis centres. Additionally, the growth in intelligent equipment and embedded systems; increased connectivity to computer and networked equipment and software; and enhanced external connectivity coupled with rapidly increasing incidents of network intrusion, more intelligent hackers, and malicious yet easily accessible software, all add to the risk as well.

There are numerous electronic security technologies and cyberintrusion countermeasures potentially available to the IACS environment. This technical report addresses several categories of cybersecurity technologies and countermeasure techniques and discusses specific types of applications within each category, the vulnerabilities addressed by each type, suggestions for their deployment, and their known strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, guidance is provided for using the various categories of security technologies and countermeasure techniques for mitigation of the above-mentioned increased risks.

This technical report does not make recommendations of one cybersecurity technology or mitigation method over others, but provides suggestions and guidance for using the technologies and methods, as well as information to consider when developing a site or corporate cybersecurity policy, program and procedures for the IACS environment.

The responsible standards development working group intends to update this technical report periodically to reflect new information, cybersecurity technologies, countermeasures, and cyberrisk mitigation methods. The committee cautions the reader that following the recommended guidance in this report will not necessarily ensure that optimized cybersecurity is attained for the reader's industrial automation or control systems environment. It will, however, help to identify and address vulnerabilities, and to reduce the risk of undesired cyberintrusions that could compromise confidential information or, even worse, cause human and environmental harm, as well as disruption or failure of the industrial network or control systems and the industry and infrastructure critical assets they monitor and regulate.

This technical report provides an evaluation and assessment of many current types of electronic-based cybersecurity technologies, mitigation methods and tools that may apply to protecting the IACS environment from detrimental cyberintrusions and attacks. For the various technologies, methods and tools introduced in this report, a discussion of their development, implementation, operations, maintenance, engineering and other user services is provided. The report also provides guidance to manufacturers, vendors, and security practitioners at end-user companies, facilities, and industries on the technological options and countermeasures for securing automated IACSs (and their associated industrial networks) against electronic (cyber) attack.

Following the recommended guidance given in this technical report will not necessarily ensure that optimized cybersecurity is attained for IACSs. It will, however, help to identify and address vulnerabilities, and to reduce the risk of undesired intrusions that could compromise confidential information or cause disruption or failure of control systems and the critical infrastructure assets they automate and control. Of more concern, use of the recommendations may aid in reducing the risk of any human or environmental harm that may result after the cyber compromise of an automated control system or its associated industrial network.

The cybersecurity guidance presented in this document is general in nature, and should be applied to each control system or network as appropriate by personnel knowledgeable in those specific industrial automation or control systems to which it is being applied. The guidance identifies those activities and actions that are typically important to provide cybersecure control

systems, but whose application is not always compatible with effective operation or maintenance of a system's functions. The guidance includes suggestions and recommendations on appropriate cybersecurity applications to specific control systems. However, selection and deployment of particular cybersecurity activities and practices for a given control system and its related industrial network is the responsibility of the system's owner.

It is intended that this guidance will mature and be modified over time, as experience is gained with control system vulnerabilities, as specific cybersecurity implementations mature, and as be ree is spected. new control-based cybersecurity technologies become available. As such, while the general format of this guidance is expected to remain relatively stable, the specifics of its application and solutions are expected to evolve.

INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS – NETWORK AND SYSTEM SECURITY –

Part 3-1: Security technologies for industrial automation and control systems

1 Scope

This part of IEC 62443 provides a current assessment of various cybersecurity tools, mitigation counter-measures, and technologies that may effectively apply to the modern electronically based IACSs regulating and monitoring numerous industries and critical infrastructures. It describes several categories of control system-centric cybersecurity technologies, the types of products available in those categories, the pros and cons of using those products in the automated IACS environments, relative to the expected threats and known cyber vulnerabilities, and, most important, the preliminary recommendations and guidance for using these cybersecurity technology products and/or countermeasures.

The concept of IACS cybersecurity as applied in this technical report is in the broadest possible sense, encompassing all types of components, plants, facilities, and systems in all industries and critical infrastructures. IACSs include, but are not limited to:

- Hardware (e.g., data historian servers) and software systems (e.g., operating platforms, configurations, applications) such as Distributed Control Systems (DCSs), Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, networked electronic sensing systems, and monitoring, diagnostic, and assessment systems. Inclusive in this hardware and software domain is the essential industrial network and any connected or related information technology (IT) devices and links critical to the successful operation to the control system at large. As such, this domain also includes, but is not limited to: firewalls, servers, routers, switches, gateways, fieldbus systems, intrusion detection systems, intelligent electronic/end devices, remote terminal units (RTUs), and both wired and wireless remote modems.
- Associated internal, human, network, or machine interfaces used to provide control, data logging, diagnostics, safety, monitoring, maintenance, quality assurance, regulatory compliance, auditing and other types of operational functionality for either continuous, batch, discrete, and combined processes.

Similarly, the concept of cybersecurity technologies and countermeasures is also broadly applied in this technical report and includes, but is not limited to, the following technologies:

- authentication and authorization;
- filtering, blocking, and access control;
- encryption;
- data validation;
- auditing;
- measurement;
- · monitoring and detection tools;
- · operating systems.

In addition, a non-cyber technology —physical security control— is an essential requirement for some aspects of cybersecurity and is discussed in this technical report.

The purpose of this technical report is to categorize and define cybersecurity technologies, countermeasures, and tools currently available to provide a common basis for later technical

reports and standards to be produced by the ISA99 committee. Each technology in this technical report is discussed in terms of:

- security vulnerabilities addressed by the technology, tool, and/or countermeasure;
- typical deployment;
- · known issues and weaknesses;
- assessment of use in the IACS environment;
- future directions:
- recommendations and guidance;
- information sources and reference material.

The intent of this technical report is to document the known state of the art of cybersecurity technologies, tools, and countermeasures applicable to the IACS environment, clearly define which technologies can reasonably be deployed today, and define areas where more research may be needed.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

<none>

3 Terms, definitions and acronyms

3.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

3.1.1

access authority

entity responsible for monitoring and granting access privileges to IACSs and their associated industrial networks for other authorized entities [3]¹

3.1.2

access control

- a) protection of system resources against unauthorized access
- b) process by which use of system resources is regulated according to a security policy and is permitted only by authorized entities (users, programs, processes, or other systems) according to that policy [3]

3.1.3

accountability

property of a system (including all of its system resources) that ensures that the actions of a system entity may be traced uniquely to that entity, which can be held responsible for its actions [3]

3.1.4

application layer protocol

layer 7 protocol specific to executing network applications such as email and file transfer [2]

¹ Numbers in square brackets refer to the Bibliography.