

English Version

## Electronic fee collection - Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems - Part 2: Trusted recorder

Perception du télépéage - Surveillance sécurisée pour  
systèmes autonomes de péage - Partie 2 : Enregistreur  
fiabilisé

Elektronische Gebührenerhebung - Sichere  
Überwachung von autonomen Mautsystemen - Teil 2:  
Zuverlässige Datenaufzeichnung

This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 25 November 2019 for provisional application.

The period of validity of this CEN/TS is limited initially to three years. After two years the members of CEN will be requested to submit their comments, particularly on the question whether the CEN/TS can be converted into a European Standard.

CEN members are required to announce the existence of this CEN/TS in the same way as for an EN and to make the CEN/TS available promptly at national level in an appropriate form. It is permissible to keep conflicting national standards in force (in parallel to the CEN/TS) until the final decision about the possible conversion of the CEN/TS into an EN is reached.

CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom.



EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION  
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION  
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG

**CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Rue de la Science 23, B-1040 Brussels**

# Contents

Page

European foreword.....	4
Introduction .....	5
1 Scope.....	7
2 Normative references.....	7
3 Terms and definitions .....	8
4 Symbols and abbreviations .....	12
5 SAM concept and scenarios .....	13
5.1 General.....	13
5.2 The concepts of TR and verification SAM .....	13
5.3 Scenarios for a trusted recorder.....	15
5.3.1 General.....	15
5.3.2 Real-Time Freezing without using a Trusted Time Source.....	15
5.3.3 Real-Time Freezing using a Trusted Time Source .....	16
5.4 Scenarios for a verification SAM .....	16
5.4.1 General.....	16
5.4.2 MAC verification .....	16
5.5 General Scenarios .....	17
5.5.1 General.....	17
5.5.2 Assigning a Toll Domain Counter .....	17
5.5.3 Obtaining SAM Information.....	18
6 Functional requirements.....	19
6.1 General.....	19
6.1.1 SAM options.....	19
6.1.2 Presentation of requirements .....	20
6.2 Basic requirements .....	20
6.3 Key management.....	21
6.4 Cryptographic functions .....	21
6.5 Real-time freezing.....	22
6.6 Verification SAM.....	23
6.7 Toll Domain Counter.....	23
6.8 Trusted time source .....	24
6.9 Security protection level .....	25
7 Interface requirements.....	26
7.1 General.....	26
7.2 Calculate MAC for real-time freezing .....	26
7.2.1 General.....	26
7.2.2 Calculation of MAC .....	27
7.2.3 Coding of request .....	27
7.2.4 Coding of response.....	28
7.3 Calculate digital signature for real-time freezing .....	28
7.3.1 General.....	28

7.3.2	Calculation of digital signature.....	29
7.3.3	Coding of request.....	29
7.3.4	Coding of response.....	29
7.4	Get device information.....	30
7.4.1	General.....	30
7.4.2	Coding of request.....	30
7.4.3	Coding of response.....	31
7.5	Get toll domain counter information.....	31
7.5.1	General.....	31
7.5.2	Coding of request.....	31
7.5.3	Coding of response.....	32
7.6	Get key information.....	32
7.6.1	General.....	32
7.6.2	Coding of request.....	33
7.6.3	Coding of response.....	33
7.7	Error handling.....	34
	Annex A (normative) Data type specification.....	35
	Annex B (normative) Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma.....	36
	Annex C (informative) Trusted Time Source implementation issues.....	49
	Annex D (informative) Use of this document for the EETS.....	51
	Bibliography.....	53

## European foreword

This document (CEN/TS 16702-2:2020) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 278 “Intelligent transport systems”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

This document supersedes CEN/TS 16702-2:2015.

The CEN/TS 16702 series, *Electronic fee collection – Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems*, is composed with the following parts:

- *Part 1: Compliance checking;*
- *Part 2: Trusted recorder.*

This document about the trusted recorder is the second part of the CEN/TS 16702 series about the secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems. The overall concept of secure monitoring is defined in CEN/TS 16702-1.

This second edition will supersede the first edition (CEN/TS 16702-2:2015), which was technically revised. The main changes compared to the previous edition are as follows:

- references to underlaying standards updated to latest version;
- updated terminology;
- slight restructuring.

This document has been prepared under a mandate given to CEN by the European Commission and the European Free Trade Association.

According to the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organisations of the following countries are bound to announce this Technical Specification: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

## Introduction


The widespread use of tolling requires provisions for users of vehicles that are roaming through many different toll domains. Users should be offered a single contract for driving a vehicle through multiple toll domains and those vehicles require on-board equipment (OBE) that is interoperable with the toll systems in these toll domains. Thus, there is a commercial and economic justification both in respect of the OBE and the toll systems for supporting interoperability. In Europe, for example, this need is recognized and legislation on interoperability has been adopted (see Directive 2004/52/EC) and the associated Commission Decision.

CEN ISO/TS 19299, *Electronic fee collection – Security framework (ISO/TS 19299)*, provides an overview of general security requirements of the stakeholders and provides a comprehensive threat analysis for the assets in an interoperable EFC scheme. Security attacks may result into less revenue of the toll charger, undercharging or not meeting required service levels between the toll service provider and the toll charger. Some of these threats can be eliminated by implementing the security measures that are specified. However, most of the security measures necessary to combat the identified threats are addressed and specified in other standards.

One example of threats that cannot be mitigated by security measures specified in CEN ISO/TS 19299 concerns the trustworthiness of Toll Declarations in autonomous toll systems. Toll declarations are statements that a vehicle has been circulating in a particular toll domain within a particular time period. In autonomous toll systems, the circulation of vehicles is measured by toll service providers, using GNSS-based OBE. Toll service providers then send Toll Declarations to the toll charger, based on which the toll charger will charge the toll service provider. The correctness and completeness of these declarations are obviously of paramount interest to toll chargers, toll service providers and users alike.

The secure monitoring compliance checking concept provides a solution that allows a toll charger to check the trustworthiness of the Toll Declarations from a toll service provider, whilst respecting the privacy of the user. This concept is defined in the CEN/TS 16702 series:

- CEN/TS 16702-1, *Electronic fee collection – Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems – Part 1: Compliance checking*, which defines the secure monitoring compliance checking concept;
- CEN/TS 16702-2, *Electronic fee collection – Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems – Part 2: Trusted recorder* (this document), which defines the trusted recorder, a secure element required for some of the different types of secure monitoring compliance checking concepts.



**Figure 1 — Relation between EFC - Security framework and the overall secure monitoring concept**

Figure 1 shows the relations between CEN ISO/TS 19299, *Electronic fee collection – Security framework*, and the CEN/TS 16702 series. The threat analysis in the Security Framework motivates the security requirements of an EFC system. The requirements are implemented and fulfilled by several security measures. One of these measures is Secure Monitoring, specified in CEN/TS 16702-1, which defines the cryptographic services necessary for the secure monitoring compliance checking concept.

Figure 1 indicates also that a trusted recorder will most likely be implemented on trusted hardware, e.g. on Secure Application Module (SAM), inside the OBE or on a general trusted platform of a vehicle. Such a trusted device could support more functions, which may be required for EFC or other services.

## 1 Scope

This document defines the requirements for the secure application module (SAM) used in the secure monitoring compliance checking concept. It specifies two different configurations of a SAM:

- trusted recorder, for use inside a piece of on-board equipment (OBE);
- verification SAM, for use in other EFC system entities.

This document describes

- terms and definitions used to describe the configurations of the two SAMs;
- operation of the two SAMs in the secure monitoring compliance checking concept;
- functional requirements for the configurations of the two SAMs, including a classification of different security levels;
- the interface, by means of transactions, messages and data elements, between an OBE or front end and the trusted recorder;
- requirements on basic security primitives and key management procedures to support Secure Monitoring using a trusted recorder.

This document is consistent with the EFC architecture as defined in EN ISO 17573-1 and the derived suite of standards and Technical Specifications, especially CEN/TS 16702-1 and CEN ISO/TS 19299.

The following is outside the scope of this document:

- The life cycle of a SAM and the way in which this is managed;
- The interface commands needed to get a SAM in an operational state;
- The interface definition of the verification SAM;
- Definition of a hardware platform for the implementation of a SAM.

## 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

CEN/TS 16702-1:2020, *Electronic fee collection - Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems - Part 1: Compliance checking*

CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, *Electronic fee collection – Security framework (ISO/TS 19299)*

EN ISO 14906, *Electronic fee collection - Application interface definition for dedicated short-range communication (ISO 14906)*

ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013, *Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange*

ISO/IEC 8825-2, *Information technology — ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Packed Encoding Rules (PER) — Part 2:*

ISO/IEC 9797-1, *Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher*

ISO/IEC 10118-3, *IT Security techniques — Hash-functions — Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions*

ISO/IEC 18031, *Information technology — Security techniques — Random bit generation*

ISO/IEC 18033-3, *Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption algorithms — Part 3: Block ciphers*

ISO/IEC 19790:2012, *Information technology — Security techniques — Security requirements for cryptographic modules*

FIPS PUB 140-2, December 2002, *Security requirements for cryptographic modules*

Common Criteria Protection Profile BSI-PP-0035, 2007, *Security IC Platform Protection Profile*, Version 1.0

### 3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:

- IEC Electropedia: available at <http://www.electropedia.org/>
- ISO Online browsing platform: available at <http://www.iso.org/obp>

#### 3.1

##### **authentication**

security mechanism allowing the verification of the provided identity

[SOURCE: EN 301 175 V1.1.1 (1998-08), Clause 3]

#### 3.2

##### **authenticator**

data, possibly encrypted, that is used for authentication

[SOURCE: EN 15509:2014, 3.3]

Note 1 to entry: In this CEN/TS either a MAC or a signature.

#### 3.3

##### **authenticity**

property that an entity is what it claims to be

[SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015, 3.5]