INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

ISO/IEC/ IEEE 8802-1AE

First edition 2013-12-01

Information technology — **Telecommunications and information** exchange between systems — Local and metropolitan area networks —

Part 1AE: Media access control (MAC) security

Technologies de l'information — Télécommunications et échange jsi Ité du c. d'information entre systèmes - Réseaux locaux et métropolitains -

Partie 1AE: Sécurité du contrôle d'accès aux supports (MAC)



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Published in Switzerland

Switzerland E-mail inmail@iec.ch Web www.iec.ch

IEC Central Office

3, rue de Varembé

CH-1211 Geneva 20

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 3 Park Avenue, New York NY 10016-5997, USA E-mail stds.ipr@ieee.org Web www.ieee.org

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ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Information technology* — *Telecommunications and information exchange between systems* — *Local and metropolitan area networks*:

- Part 11: Wireless LAN medium access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications
- Part 1X: Port-based network access control
- Part 1AE: Media access control (MAC) security
- Part 15-4: Wireless medium access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications for low-rate wireless personal area networks (WPANs)



IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks

Media Access Control (MAC) Security

IEEE Computer Society

Sponsored by the LAN/MAN Standards Committee

IEEE 3 Park Avenue New York, NY 10016-5997, USA

18 August 2006

IEEE Std 802.1AE™-2006

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IEEE Std 802.1AE[™]-2006

IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks:

Conn committee Media Access Control (MAC) Security

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LAN/MAN Standards Committee of the **IEEE Computer Society**

Approved 8 June 2006

IEEE-SA Standards Board

Abstract: This standard specifies how all or part of a network can be secured transparently to peer protocol entities that use the MAC Service provided by IEEE 802[®] LANs to communicate. MAC security (MACsec) provides connectionless user data confidentiality, frame data integrity, and data origin authenticity.

Keywords: authorized port, data origin authenticity, integrity/confidentiality, LANs, local area s, k assed f, ging networks, MAC Bridges, MAC security and tack, MAC Service, MANs, metropolitan area networks, MSAP, port-based network access control, secure association, security, service access point, transparent bridging

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 3 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5997, USA

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ISBN 0-7381-4990-X SH95549 Print: PDF: ISBN 0-7381-4991-8 SS95549

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Introduction

This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Media Access Control (MAC) Security.

This is the first edition of this standard.

Relationship between IEEE Std 802.1AE and other IEEE 802 standards

Another IEEE standard, IEEE Std $802.1X^{TM}$ -2004, specifies Port-based Network Access Control, and provides a means of authenticating and authorizing devices attached to a LAN. Use of this standard in conjunction with architecture and protocols of IEEE Std 802.1X-2004 extends the applicability of the latter to publicly accessible LAN/MAN media for which security has not already been defined. A proposed amendment, IEEE P802.1afTM, to IEEE Std 802.1X-2004 is being developed to specify the additional protocols and interfaces necessary.

This standard is not intended for use with IEEE Std 802.11^{TM} , Wireless LAN Medium Access Control. An amendment to that standard, IEEE Std $802.11i^{\text{TM}}$ -2004, also makes use of IEEE Std 802.1X-2004, thus facilitating the use of a common authentication and authorization framework for LAN media to which this standard applies and for Wireless LANs.

A previous security standard, IEEE Std 802.10[™], IEEE Standard for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security, has been withdrawn.

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IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks:

Media Access Control (MAC) Security

1. Overview

1.1 Introduction

IEEE 802[®] Local Area Networks (LANs) are often deployed in networks that support mission-critical applications. These include corporate networks of considerable extent, and public networks that support many customers with different economic interests. The protocols that configure, manage, and regulate access to these networks typically run over the networks themselves. Preventing disruption and data loss arising from transmission and reception by unauthorized parties is highly desirable, since it is not practical to secure the entire network against physical access by determined attackers.

MAC Security (MACsec), as defined by this standard, allows authorized systems that attach to and interconnect LANs in a network to maintain confidentiality of transmitted data and to take measures against frames transmitted or modified by unauthorized devices.

MACsec facilitates

- a) Maintenance of correct network connectivity and services
- b) Isolation of denial of service attacks
- c) Localization of any source of network communication to the LAN of origin
- d) The construction of public networks, offering service to unrelated or possibly mutually suspicious customers, using shared LAN infrastructures
- e) Secure communication between organizations, using a LAN for transmission
- f) Incremental and non-disruptive deployment, protecting the most vulnerable network components.

To deliver these benefits, MACsec has to be used in conjunction with appropriate policies for higher-level protocol operation in networked systems, an authentication and authorization framework, and network management. IEEE P802.1afTM [B2]¹ provides authentication and cryptographic key distribution.

MACsec protects communication between trusted components of the network infrastructure, thus protecting the network operation. MACsec cannot protect against attacks facilitated by the trusted components

¹The numbers in brackets correspond to those of the bibliography in Annex B.

themselves, and is complementary to, rather than a replacement for, end-to-end application-to-application security protocols. The latter can secure application data independent of network operation, but cannot necessarily defend the operation of network components, or prevent attacks using unauthorized communication from reaching the systems that operate the applications.

1.2 Scope

The scope of this standard is to specify provision of connectionless user data confidentiality, frame data integrity, and data origin authenticity by media access independent protocols and entities that operate transparently to MAC Clients.

NOTE—The MAC Clients are as specified in IEEE Std 802, IEEE Std 802.2TM, IEEE Std 802.1DTM, IEEE Std 802.1QTM, and IEEE Std 802.1XTM.²

To this end it

- a) Specifies the requirements to be satisfied by equipment claiming conformance to this standard.
- b) Specifies the requirements for MAC Security in terms of provision of the MAC Service and the preservation of the semantics and parameters of service requests and indications.
- c) Describes the threats, both intentional and accidental, to correct provision of the service.
- d) Specifies security services that prevent, or restrict, the effect of attacks that exploit these threats.
- e) Examines the potential impact of both the threats and the use of MAC Security on the Quality of Service (QoS), specifying constraints on the design and operation of MAC Security entities and protocols.
- f) Models support of the secure MAC Service in terms of the operation of media access control method independent MAC Security Entities (SecYs) within the MAC Sublayer.
- g) Specifies the format of the MACsec Protocol Data Unit (MPDUs) used to provide secure service.
- h) Identifies the functions to be performed by each SecY, and provides an architectural model of its internal operation in terms of Processes and Entities that provide those functions.
- i) Specifies the interface/exchanges between a SecY and its associated and collocated MAC Security Key Agreement Entity (KaY, IEEE P802.1af [B2]) that provides and updates cryptographic keys.
- j) Specifies performance requirements and recommends default values and applicable ranges for the operational parameters of a SecY.
- k) Specifies how SecYs are incorporated within the architectural structure within end stations and bridges.
- 1) Establishes the requirements for management of MAC Security, identifying the managed objects and defining the management operations for SecYs.
- m) Specifies the Management Information Base (MIB) module for managing the operation of MAC Security in TCP/IP networks.
- n) Specifies requirements, criteria and choices of Cipher Suites for use with this standard.

This standard does not

 Specify how the relationships between MACsec protocol peers are discovered and authenticated, as supported by key management or key distribution protocols, but makes use of IEEE P802.1af Key Agreement for MAC security to achieve these functions.

²Notes in text, tables, and figures are given for information only, and do not contain requirements needed to implement the standard.

2. Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments or corrigenda) applies.

Federal Information Processing Standards FIPS 197, Advanced Encryption Standard, 2001, Advanced Encryption Standard Cyclic Block Chaining (AES-CBC).³

Galois Counter Mode of Operation (GCM), David A. McGrew, John Viega.⁴

IEEE Std 802, IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Overview and Architecture.^{5, 6}

IEEE Std 802.1D-2003, IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Media Access Control (MAC) Bridges.

IEEE Std 802.1Q-2005, IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks.

IEEE Std 802.1X-2004, IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port Based Network Access Control.

IEEE Std 802.1ad[™]-2005, IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks—Amendment 4: Provider Bridges.

IEEE Std 802.1AB[™]-2005, IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Station and Media Access Control Connectivity and Discovery.

IEEE Std 802.2[™], IEEE Standard for Information technology—Telecommunications and information exchange between systems—Local and metropolitan area networks—Specific requirements—Part 2: Logical link control.

IEEE Std 802.3[™], IEEE Standard for Information technology—Part 3: Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) Access Method and Physical Layer Specifications.

IEEE Std 802.11[™], IEEE Standard for Information technology—Telecommunications and information exchange between systems—Local and metropolitan area networks—Specific requirements—Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications.

IEEE Std 802.11i[™], IEEE Standard for Information technology—Telecommunications and information exchange between systems—Local and metropolitan area networks—Specific requirements—Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications—Media Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements.

IEEE Std 802.17[™], IEEE Standard for Information technology—Telecommunications and information exchange between systems—Local and metropolitan area networks—Specific requirements—Part 17: Resilient packet ring (RPR) access method & physical layer specifications.

³FIPS publications are available from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Rd., Springfield, VA 22161 (http://www.ntis.org/).

⁴This document can be downloaded from http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-spec.pdf.

⁵IEEE publications are available from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331, USA. IEEE publications can be ordered on-line from the IEEE Standards Website: http://www.standards.ieee.org ⁶The IEEE standards or products referred to in this clause are trademarks of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

IETF RFC 1213: Management Information Base for Network Management of TCP/IP-based internets: MIB-II, K. McCloghrie, M.T. Rose, March 1991.

IETF RFC 2578, STD 58, Structure of Management Information for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2), McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M., Waldbusser, S., April 1999.

IETF RFC 2579, STD 58, Textual Conventions for Version 2 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv2), McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M., Waldbusser, S., April 1999.

IETF RFC 2580, STD 58, Conformance Statements for SMIv2, McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., Schoenwaelder, J., Case, J., Rose, M., Waldbusser, S., April 1999.

IETF RFC 2863, The Interfaces Group MIB using SMIv2, McCloghrie, K. and Kastenholz, F., June 2000.

IETF RFC 3418, Management Information Base (MIB) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), Preshun, R., ED., December 2002.

ISO/IEC 7498-1, Information processing systems-Open Systems Interconnection-Basic Reference Model—Part 1: The Basic Model.⁷

ISO/IEC 7498-2, Information processing systems—Open Systems Interconnection—Basic Reference Model-Part 2: Security architecture.

ISO/IEC 14882, Information Technology-Programming languages-C++.

unicatic ommon sp. ISO/IEC 15802-1, Information technology-Telecommunications and information exchange between systems-Local and metropolitan area networks-Common specifications-Part 1: Medium Access Control (MAC) service definition.

⁷ISO/IEC publications are available from the ISO Central Secretariat, Case Postale 56, 1 rue de Varembé, CH-1211, Genève 20, Swit zerland/Suisse (http://www.iso.ch/). ISO/IEC publications are also available in the United States from Global Engineering Documents, 15 Inverness Way East, Englewood, Colorado 80112, USA (http://global.ihs.com/). Electronic copies are available in the United States from the American National Standards Institute, 25 West 43rd Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10036, USA (http://www.ansi.org/).

3. Definitions

For the purposes of this standard, the following terms and definitions apply. *The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms*, Seventh Edition [B3], should be referenced for terms not defined in this clause.

3.1 Association Number (AN): A number that is concatenated with the Secure Channel Identifier to identify a Secure Association.

3.2 bounded receive delay: A guarantee that a frame will not be delivered after a known bounded time, in the case of protocols designed to use the MAC Service this is typically assumed to be less than two seconds.

3.3 Bridged Local Area Network: A concatenation of individual IEEE 802 LANs interconnected by MAC Bridges.

NOTE—Unless explicitly specified the use of the word *network* in this standard refers to a Bridged Local Area Network. The term *Bridged Local Area Network* is not otherwise abbreviated. The term *Local Area Network* and the abbreviation *LAN* are used exclusively to refer to an individual LAN specified by a MAC technology without the inclusion of Bridges. This precise use of terminology within this specification allows a Bridged Local Area Network to be distinguished from an individual LAN that has been bridged to other LANs in the network. In more general usage such precise terminology is not required, as it is an explicit goal of this standard that MAC Security is transparent to the users of the MAC Service.

3.4 Cipher Suite: A set of one or more algorithms, designed to provide any number of the following: data confidentiality, data authenticity, data integrity.

3.5 Common Port: An instance of the MAC Internal Sublayer Service used by the SecY to provide transmission and reception of frames for both the controlled and uncontrolled ports.

3.6 Controlled Port: The access point used to provide the secure MAC Service to a client of a SecY.

3.7 cryptographic key: A parameter that determines the operation of a cryptographic function such as:

- a) The transformation from plain text to cipher text and vice versa
- b) Synchronized generation of keying material
- c) Digital signature computation or validation.⁸

3.8 cryptographic mode of operation: Also referred to as mode. An algorithm for the cryptographic transformation of data that features a symmetric key block cipher algorithm.⁹

3.9 data integrity: A property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since it was created, transmitted or stored.¹⁰

3.10 IEEE 802 Local Area Network (LAN): IEEE 802 LANs (also referred to in the text simply as LANs) are LAN technologies that provide a MAC Service equivalent to the MAC Service defined in ISO/IEC 15802-1. IEEE 802 LANs include IEEE Std 802.3 (CSMA/CD), IEEE Std 802.11 (Wireless), IEEE Std 802.17 (Resilient Packet Ring).

3.11 initialization vector (IV): A vector used in defining the starting point of an encryption process within a cryptographic algorithm.¹¹

⁸This and some other definitions in this clause have been drawn from ASC TR1/X9, Technical Report for ABA ASC/X9 Standards Definitions, Acronyms, and Symbols, 2002.

⁹This and some other definitions in this clause have been drawn from NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques, 2001.

¹⁰This and some other definitions in this clause have been drawn from NIST Special Publication 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management, 2005.